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ABSTRACT 
 
We analyze the environmental impact of capital inflows and investigate the halo effect 
(FDI improves the environment). We control for the type of FDI inflows, the EKC 
(Environmental Kuznets Curve) effect and country income level, and find (i) a differential 
industry effect: while total foreign investment in aggregate has a negative effect on all 
countries, this can be traced in particular to capital flows to manufacturing and 
nonfinancial services sectors.; (ii) an income inequality effect: foreign investment flowing 
into poorer countries has harmful effects on environment consistent with the race-to-the 
bottom argument, while capital flowing to richer countries has a beneficial effect and 
supports the halo effect; (iii) the EKC effect depends on the sector absorbing the FDI 
and again income level of the country. We show that studies relying only on firm level or 
aggregate data, miss the sectoral spillovers, and thus may lead to misleading 
conclusions. 
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GLOBALIZATION AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL SPILLOVER OF 
SECTORAL FDI†   
 
 
 
Introduction 
The 2008 financial crises and extreme climate events such as floods, hurricanes and droughts that 
the world has been experiencing with an increased frequency since the beginning of the 21st century 
have one common message: with globalization, extreme events are no longer rare and can hit both 
industrialized and developing economies alike.  Just as the financial crisis that originated in the 
United States has transformed into a global recession, the climate change that started a while ago 
is being felt now throughout the world at an ever-increasing rate. The main difference is that unlike 
recessions, a change in the climate may be irreversible.  
The academic and public discourse link globalization and environment in several ways. 
Globalization is blamed to degrade the environment through two channels.  (i) The pollution haven, 
or race-to-the bottom.  Accordingly, with liberalized trade flows, businesses operating under tight 
environmental regulation in developed countries can shift polluting industries to countries with lax 
regulation; (ii) The “Environmental Kuznets Curve” (EKC), described by an inverse U-shaped 
relation between pollution and income, states that economic growth (often associated with 
globalization) increases pollution in low-income economies until they reach a certain level of 
development, and decreases it thereafter.  Both channels, however, are mitigated by the more recent 
literature, which revealed a “halo effect”.  The Halo Effect hypothesis states that multinational 
companies disseminate superior knowledge and apply environmentally friendly practices while 
improving the environmental performance of domestic business.   
The globalization’s effect on the environment is mostly analyzed via the trade channel and 
less so via the capital flows channel, and more specifically, the foreign direct investment (FDI).  
All three effects can be triggered by multinational companies that invest in physical plants and 
equipment, and contribute to the production and growth in host countries, as well as affecting the 
environment.  The view that multinationals impact the environment has its parallel in the literature 
that examines the productivity gains generated by foreign firms investing in host country, via 
spillovers of knowledge, knowhow, etc.  
For a regulatory body it is crucial to know which effect is triggered by companies, whether 
foreign or domestic.  For business, especially those operating internationally, it is critical to know 
its impact on carbon emissions and manage its risks.  Business and investors are facing increased 
restrictions and regulations from authorities forced to cut emissions.  Managing the climate-
generated risk is becoming an important objective of companies and therefore, many businesses 
and insurers are supporting clear measures and regulations.   
In this study, we propose to understand the impact of globalization on the host country’s 
environment by examining the halo effect of FDI inflows, controlling for a number of factors that 
may bias the results.  More specifically, we analyze how sector-specific FDI inflows impact 
pollution in the countries in our sample and test whether a halo effect is present. Our study shows 
that unless it is considered at the sectoral level, the relation between foreign investment and the 
Page | 2  
 
environment is not clear-cut.  Our results help identify the sectors where more or less regulation is 
required.   
 
Contribution of this study to the literature 
The review of the literature below highlights various drawbacks that prevent establishing a clear 
relation between pollution and capital flows.  First, most studies that examined the impact of 
globalization on the environment considered these effects separately, with a plethora of data and 
samples at the firm level or country level, which makes it difficult to draw any consistent 
conclusion.  Second, the methodology adopted is time-averaged cross-section approach, which is 
inadequate to analyze a dynamic phenomenon such as greenhouse gas emissions with little or no 
reversion. Finally, idiosyncratic shocks to different sectors may overweigh the regional shocks and 
conceal differences at the industry level, and may explain the reason behind inconclusive results in 
the literature.  We address these drawbacks by adopting a unified framework and a dynamic model 
that allows the analysis of all three effects over time and a long span of data covering multi-country 
and industries. We identify the channels through which the halo effect manifests, controlling for 
the type of FDI inflows, the EKC effect and the level of development of the economies.   
The work on the environmental impact of total FDI uses an aggregate measure, which 
conceals sectoral effects. At the other end of the spectrum, the analyses that examine the investment 
decisions at the firm level miss the impact of these decisions, which can only be observed at the 
more aggregate sectoral level and the intersectoral spillovers.  Our industry analysis uses the largest 
and the longest data span available.  Growth studies have shown that FDI that flows to different 
sectors have different impact on sectoral and aggregate growth, through spillovers to different 
industries (Doytch and Uctum, 2011). Likewise, we expect different effect by different sectoral 
FDI inflows on pollution (e.g., financial FDI might impact the environment even though it goes to 
a non-polluting services industry).   
Many of the previous studies struggle with endogeneity and simultaneity.  The explanatory 
variables used in the empirical studies are likely to influence each other, or the dependent variable 
can affect the independent variables.  For example, a country with restrictive environmental laws 
may reduce pollution but they may be also a reaction to pollution; or pollution may change by FDI 
but it can also determine the amount of FDI inflows. Independent variables may also affect each 
other: laws may influence the flow of FDI, high growth in turn can encourage FDI and lead to 
sectoral shifts in the economy impacting pollution.  Such simultaneity problems can create 
substantial biases in the estimates, which make results meaningless. To address these issue, we 
adopt a dynamic panel data approach (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998), a 
methodology that circumvents similar problems.1 We instrument FDI and GDP, which addresses 
endogeneity issues related to growth-FDI-pollution.  Another advantage of the GMM estimator is 
that it exploits both the time series dynamics and the pooled country characteristics of the data 
while controlling for endogeneity and omitted variable biases. This allows us to retain the time-
series aspect of the data and the dynamic aspects of changes in the sectoral flows of FDI, a feature 
that the traditional approach of the cross-sectional time-averaging methodology is not able to 
capture.   In addition, by breaking down the FDI data according to industries and categorizing the 
economies according to time-varying country income levels (see below for more details) we 
indirectly control for potential biases caused by sectoral shifts that occur due to economic 
development.   
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 We show that results on the capital flow-pollution nexus depend critically on the type of 
FDI flows and income distribution.  First, we find a differential industry effect: while total foreign 
investment in aggregate has a negative effect on all countries, this can be traced in particular to 
capital flows to manufacturing and nonfinancial services sectors.  Second, we uncover a striking 
income inequality effect: foreign investment flowing into poorer countries has harmful effects on 
environment consistent with the race-to-the bottom argument, while capital flowing to richer 
countries has a beneficial effect and supports the halo effect. Third, we find that the EKC effect 
depends on the sector absorbing the FDI and again income level of the country.  Evidence supports 
EKC effect (i.e. pollution decreases with economic development) in services in the full sample, in 
low-income countries, and in manufacturing in high-income countries.  In all other instances it is 
not validated by the data. 
 
Literature Review 
The two hypotheses discussed above, the Halo Effect and the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) 
are interrelated.  The halo effect follows the productivity literature in spirit, which examines the 
productivity spillovers by FDI, both at the firm and macroeconomic levels.2   Positive 
environmental impact is triggered if the multinational corporations (MNCs) encourage the 
dissemination of environmentally clean technologies and management practices.  This occurs when 
the foreign firm engages in contracts only with environmentally responsible domestic counterparts. 
This may happen under shareholder pressure at the MNC or because of practices established by the 
MNC’s home country environmental regulations and standards. Further environmental knowledge 
can disseminate through the movement of trained workers from foreign to domestic firms (Görg 
and Strobl, 2005) or because of a direct competition of domestic firms with the MNCs. 
The literature on environmental impact of FDI confines mainly to case studies of specific 
countries’ manufacturing industry firms. The evidence with respect to the halo hypothesis has been 
mixed (Paigel and Wheeler, 1996). In a limited Indonesian manufacturing firms study conducted 
for the period 1989-90 with respect to water pollution, Hartman et al. (1997) conclude that 
"abatement... is... unaffected by foreign links (in ownership financing)".  Dasgupta et al. (2000) 
examine the impact of regulation, plant-level management policies, and other factors on the 
environmental compliance of Mexican manufacturers and find no significance for the foreign 
ownership variable as well.   
More recently, however, Eskeland and Harrison (2003) analyze outbound US FDI and 
find that foreign plants are significantly more energy efficient and cleaner in their energy uses 
than their domestic partners, which supports the halo hypothesis.  Another supporting evidence 
for the halo hypothesis comes from the study by Cole et al. (2008) who assess the extent to which 
foreign ownership influences the energy intensity in Ghana. The authors focus on the extent to 
which workers with experience in a foreign owned firm transfer their knowledge to benefit the 
local environment. They find the foreign training of firm's decision maker does reduce fuel use 
especially in foreign owned firms.   
Finally, in a sample of Argentinean firms, Albornoz et al (2009) find supporting evidence 
that (i) foreign-owned firms are more likely to implement environmental management systems 
compared to domestic firms; (ii) firms that supply sectors with high multinationals more likely 
adopt environmental management systems; (iii) firms’ absorptive capacity, ownership and export 
status also influence the extent to which they benefit from environmental spillovers.3  
Page | 4  
 
Additional factors such as economic growth and exogenously imposed emission targets 
also lead to a shift in the mix of sectoral capital flows.  Our methodology controls to a large 
extent for such exogenous factors.  FDI and GDP are instrumented, which makes them exogenous 
to pollution.  We tested for the Kyoto protocol with a dummy and found no significant effect.  
EKC, the second but the older line of research in environmental economics, states that the 
quality of the environment worsens as the economy grows and once a certain threshold is reached, 
it starts improving, resulting in an inverse U-shaped pollution-GDP per capita pattern.  This line of 
argument parallels that of the structural change in development whereby the share of manufacturing 
in the economy grows in the initial phase of development but later decreases as the services 
overtake the role of manufacturing in growth.  The implication of EKC is that environmental quality 
increases with economic growth after a threshold.  The estimation model consists of the cubic or 
quadratic income terms and their lagged values, and a vector of control variables including policy, 
trade, and institutional variables.  The initial research corroborated the EKC argument (Shafik, 
1994, Grossman and Krueger, 1995, Holtz-Eaking and Selden, 1995, Hilton and Levinson, 1998).  
More recent research, however casts doubt on the existence of a neat inverse U-shaped relation 
(Stern, 1998, Harbaugh et al. 2002, Hettige et al. 2000).  
As this brief overview of the literature indicates, most studies and in particular those in 
environmental spillover literature are conducted at firm level.  They give partial, industry-specific 
insight into the experience of a given country.  It is not surprising that literature cannot provide us 
with a lesson about the global nature of capital flows, which could help us understand events in 
other contexts. For this, a multi-country, sectoral approach is more appropriate. Our study remedies 
this weakness and conducts such a sectoral level analysis of the impact of FDI on environmental 
performance of domestic economies, measured by the levels of air pollution. 4  
 
Conceptual framework 
Our approach is in the spirit of Marcusen et al. (1995) extended to two imperfectly competitive 
firms operating in two countries in a partial equilibrium model.  A domestic and a foreign firm 
compete in both markets with heterogeneous products that are imperfect substitutes for each 
other.   Each individual firm can affect the price of its own product in the market it is competing.  
Each firm can choose whether to produce only domestically or to build plants in both countries 
and produce both locally and in the foreign country.  Following the literature, we will denote the 
firm as “national” if it is producing domestically and as “multinational” if it is producing 
domestically and in the foreign country.  The model considers only horizontal FDI and ignores 
vertical FDI following the evidence in the literature (see Markusen, 1995, Carr et al.,2001). 
Pollution is a by-product of the production of goods as assumed in the literature and 
created by local production.  We keep the model as simple as possible and abstain from any 
strategic considerations between firms or governments, or issues around abatement or spatial 
effects.  Pollution 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 at time t in country i depends on total production Q and on an exogenous 
component D. 
(1) 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐷𝐷 + 𝜓𝜓𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖          
Total production in the host economy consists of the production of the domestic firm, which may 
or may not be a multinational, and the production of the foreign multinational firm: 
(2)  𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖            
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where X, 𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓 are, respectively, the domestic production of the domestic firm and the local 
production of the foreign firm if it is a multinational, or its export to the domestic country if it is a 
foreign-national firm.  Since the goal of this study is to examine the environmental impact of FDI 
inflows, we consider the specific case where the foreign firm is a multinational firm producing 
both at home and in the host country and the domestic firm is a national firm that produces 
locally.  Both firms produce with the same technology using capital, K and labor, L and the 
pollution level (𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷 and 𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓) that minimize their cost. We consider pollution as an input to the 
production process but it could also be equivalently considered as a joint production technology 
(Siebert et al., 1980, Copeland and Taylor 2004). In a static equilibrium, ignoring the time 
subscript the cost minimization of the domestic firm can be written as: 
𝐶𝐶 =𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 + 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝑇𝑇𝑍𝑍  
subject to the resource constraint: 
𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷
𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺(𝑅𝑅, 𝑊𝑊)1−𝛼𝛼 ≥ 𝑋𝑋�  
𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷 ≤ 𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷����  
where G(.) is increasing, concave and homogenous, 0 <∝< 1, W, R and T denote the wage rate,  
capital rental rate and cost (price) of pollution, 𝑋𝑋�is the target output level and 𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷 and ?̅?𝑍𝐷𝐷 are, 
respectively,  pollution produced by domestic firm  and the target or maximum allowable 
emission level for this firm.  Substituting the conditional demands into the production function 
gives the optimal output of the domestic firm: 
(3) 𝐻𝐻 = 𝐻𝐻(Γ, ?̅?𝑍𝐷𝐷 , 𝑋𝑋�)  
where Γ is a vector of domestic cost of production.   
Foreign firm produces domestically and in the host country and thus contributes to 
emissions in both countries.  For its production in the host country, it uses the local labor and 
pays the local wages.  For its production in its home economy, it hires labor and pays salary of 
the foreign country.  Since goods are imperfect substitutes, the cost function is separable. The 
foreign multinational firm minimizes 
𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓 = �𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓 +𝑊𝑊∗𝑊𝑊∗�+ �𝑅𝑅∗𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 + 𝑅𝑅∗𝑅𝑅∗�+ (𝑇𝑇𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓 + 𝑇𝑇∗𝑍𝑍∗)  
 
 Subject to: 
𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓
𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹�𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 , 𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓�1−𝛼𝛼 ≥ 𝑋𝑋�𝑓𝑓  
𝑍𝑍∗𝛼𝛼𝐹𝐹(𝑅𝑅∗, 𝑊𝑊∗)1−𝛼𝛼 ≥ 𝑋𝑋�∗  
𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓 ≤ ?̅?𝑍𝑓𝑓  
𝑍𝑍∗ ≤ ?̅?𝑍∗  
 
To produce 𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓 in the host country the multinational firm employs labor from the host country, 𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓, 
at the prevailing local cost, W and brings in FDI, 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓, which it rents at its home market at the rate 
R*.  It also produces X* in its home market with labor and capital, at the cost of W* and R*.  Both 
plants contribute to the emissions by 𝑍𝑍𝑓𝑓 in the host country, and Z* in the home country of the 
multinational where the firm faces similarly target levels of emissions and output, and pays a 
price of T*. To focus on the pollution produced in the host country, we will ignore the production 
activity of the multinational firm in its home country.   
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We substitute the optimal factor demands into the production functions to get the optimal 
output for each firm.  After appropriate substitutions and log linearizing we can obtain a pollution 
equation of the form: (4) 𝑧𝑧 =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝛾𝛾 + 𝛼𝛼2𝛾𝛾𝑓𝑓 + 𝛼𝛼3?̅?𝑥 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑥𝑥𝑓𝑓��� + 𝛼𝛼5𝑧𝑧𝐷𝐷��� + 𝛼𝛼6𝑧𝑧𝑓𝑓� + 𝛼𝛼7𝑓𝑓   
where lower case-letters are the logs of the upper-case letters, f is FDI inflows (see Appendix 1 
for the derivation and the definition of coefficients in the equation).  
 
Methodology 
Several FDI studies in the literature examine the impact of environmental regulation as an 
independent variable. These studies belong to the strand of the literature emphasizing the 
determinants of FDI.  Our emphasis differs in the sense that what we want to examine is how capital 
flows directly affect pollution in a country, while controlling for the EKC effect.  It is clear that 
these factors are simultaneously determined and their nonlinear interaction is not addressed.  The 
methodology outlined below is designed to control such biases. 
To assess the impact of FDI and growth on pollution in a form comparable to the empirical 
studies in the literature, we can transform the equation (4) as follows (see Appendix 1): 
(5) 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖  =  𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎2𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎3𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖   
 
where we used several assumptions: symmetric effect for each firm’s output and target emissions 
on total pollution ( 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷����
= 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑍𝑍�𝑓𝑓
  and 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋�
= 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋�𝑓𝑓
 ), and the identities 𝑞𝑞 = ?̅?𝑥 + ?̅?𝑥𝑓𝑓  and 𝑧𝑧 = 𝑧𝑧?̅?𝐷 + 𝑧𝑧?̅?𝑓.  
Although y is a vector that represents the country-fixed effects that proxy the production costs, it is 
commonly defined to include additional control variables such as institutional and demographic 
variables.  
 
Equation (5) is based on a static optimization of the firm’s problem, which we use to guide us to 
determine the control variables consistent with the ones used in the literature.  In order to capture 
the strong memory of pollution, as well as the EKC effect, we extend our model to include dynamic 
effects.  The estimated form that we adopt is therefore   
          
 
(6) 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖� = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 log�𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1� + 𝛽𝛽2 log(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽3�log�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖��2 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗                                                  + 𝛽𝛽5𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
 
with ),0(..~
i
diii µσµ , ),i.i.d.(0,~ εσε it 0][ =itiE εµ  and where where i is the country subscript,  
the subscript j stands for an index for total, agricultural, mining, manufacturing, total services, 
financial services, non-financial services FDI.  The variable 𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 is a measure of air pollution, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
is log of per capita GDP, 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗 is the net capital inflow share of GDP.  The remaining variables are 
the explicit components of 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 : The variable 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 is “control of corruption”, a proxy for the 
institutional variable.  It is indexed between 1 and 10, 10 being the highest control of corruption; 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 represents population density, a proxy for demographic factors, 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 is a time dummy and 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 
is an idiosyncratic country specific effect.   
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The level and the square of GDP capture the EKC hypothesis, 𝛽𝛽2 > 0, 𝛽𝛽3 < 0, which leads 
to an inverse-U shaped relation between pol and y.  For the halo effect to hold, the null hypothesis 
is 𝛽𝛽4 < 0.  We expect 𝛽𝛽5 < 0, that is, for an increase in the control of corruption to improve the 
institutions of a country and hence to reduce pollution through more stringent regulation to protect 
the environment, and 𝛽𝛽6 > 0, population density to increase the pollution level.   
We use the GMM methodology because it is more suitable for our purposes.  Panel data is 
to be preferred to cross-sectional when analyzing change in the dependent variable because of the 
correlation between lagged dependent variables and the unobserved residual.  Cross-section 
estimates produce a bias, caused by the correlation between 1, −tipol  and iµ , which disappears in 
samples with large time-dimension but does not disappear with time-averaging. Thus, if such a 
correlation exists, the true underlying structure has a dynamic nature and time-averaging cross-
section techniques introduce a bias that cannot be removed by controlling for fixed-effects.  
Therefore, to avoid these pitfalls, we adopt the GMM methodology.  
A potential problem of the Arellano-Bond difference GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) 
estimator is that, under certain conditions, the variance of the estimates may increase asymptotically 
and create considerable bias if: (i) the dependent variable follows a random walk, which makes the 
first lag a poor instrument for its difference, (ii) the explanatory variables are persistent over time, 
which makes the lagged levels weak instruments for their differences, (iii) the time dimension of 
the sample is small (Alonso-Borrego and Arellano, 1996 and Blundell and Bond, 1998).  For these 
reasons we are using the Alonso-Borrego and Arellano, and Blundell and Bond methodology.  For 
this, we transform the regression equation in first difference while including the lagged levels of 
the dependent variable according to the lags in the instrumental matrix.  Because of these lagged 
level equations we are able to keep the fixed-country-effect in the regressions.  
An additional necessary condition for the efficiency of the Blundell-Bond system GMM 
estimator is that, even if the unobserved country-specific effect is correlated with the regressors’ 
levels, it is not correlated with their differences. The condition also means that the deviations of the 
initial values of the independent variables from their long-run values are not systematically related 
to the country-specific effects. 5 We instrument both income and FDI with GMM style instruments, 
which will account for reverse causality between these variables and the pollution variable. 6 We 
impose a limitation on the number of lags used to preserve degrees of freedom. We use three lags 
and perform robustness checks removing the restriction on the lags.  
 
Data and Sources 
The data are yearly, multi-country, span a long period from 1984 to 2011, and come from various 
sources.  The key independent variables are disaggregated FDI flows share of GDP denominated 
in current USD. All FDI series are net flows, accounting for the purchases and sales of domestic 
assets by foreigners in the corresponding year.  FDI is defined as investment that “reflects the 
objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a resident entity in one economy (‘‘direct investor'') in 
an entity resident in an economy other than that of the investor (‘‘direct investment enterprise'')” 
(OECD, International direct investment database, Metadata). This lasting interest implies a long-
term relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant influence on the 
management of the enterprise. The data on sectoral FDI inflows to agriculture, mining, 
manufacturing, financial services and nonfinancial services FDI are compiled from United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
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Development (OECD), The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and individual 
national statistical agencies web sites.  
The dependent variable, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are from OECD and World 
Development Indicators (WDI).  CO2 emissions are defined as the emissions stemming from the 
burning of fossil fuels and the manufacture of cement. They include carbon dioxide produced 
during consumption of solid, liquid, and gas fuels and gas flaring. CO2 emissions are measured in 
kilotons (kt).  
Population density (people per sq. km of land area) is midyear population divided by land 
area in square kilometers. Population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts 
all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship--except for refugees not permanently settled in 
the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their country of 
origin. Land area is a country's total area, excluding area under inland water bodies, national claims 
to continental shelf, and exclusive economic zones. In most cases the definition of inland water 
bodies includes major rivers and lakes. 
 Institutional variables are from the International Country Risk Group (ICRG).  Following 
the FDI and pollution literature, we adopted the control of corruption as an independent variable 
and we conducted robustness check with law and order (see below).  This measure is indexed from 
0 to 6, 0 representing the countries with worst corruption and 6 representing countries with the best 
practices.  Corruption includes financial corruption, favoritism, nepotism, etc.  Descriptive statistics 
of all variables are presented in Table 1A and Table 2A in Appendix. 
 We use an income distribution country classification, provided by the World Bank. We 
categorize all countries following the current World Bank income brackets for "Low"; "Lower 
Middle"; "Upper Middle" and "High" income countries that are respectively  GNI<=$1,045;  
$1,045 < GNI<= $4,125; $4,125<GNI<= $12,736; and GNI >$12,736, where GNI, the gross 
national income, is computed based on the  "World Bank Atlas" method. Since there are few 
observations in the lower-middle income category, we combine it with the low-income category 
and label it “low-income” and label the World Bank’s "Upper-Middle Income" category as 
"Middle-Income". Our last category "High-Income" countries is the same as that of the World 
Bank.   
 Since our sample spans a long period of time, several countries move up the brackets during 
this period.  To account for the change in the income level of each economy, instead of taking the 
income distribution among countries as static, we evaluate each country’s GNI at each time period 
to determine the category it falls.  This gives us a more appropriate time-varying income-level 
classification. Appendix 2 displays the list of countries in the sample and the income categories 
they fall in following our methodology.   
  
 
Empirical Results 
The idiosyncratic shocks to different sectors may overweigh the regional shocks, conceal 
differences at the industry level, and may explain the reason behind inconclusive results in the 
literature.  Our aim is to expose such effects if they exist.  For this, we now turn to analyzing the 
impact on industry pollution of sectoral and aggregate FDI, given a set of control variables. We 
examine the primary, secondary (manufacturing) and tertiary (services) sectors by further 
disaggregating the primary sector into agriculture and mining, and the tertiary sector into financial 
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and nonfinancial sectors.  Our results below show substantial intersectoral differences not 
detectable in the aggregate FDI data. 
To control for heterogeneity caused by the level of development, we break down the data 
according to income distribution measures and examine the same effects in four income categories 
ranging from lowest to highest-income countries following the World Bank specification: low-
income, lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income, high-income.  Since the number of countries 
in lower income category is small, we combine the low-income with the lower-middle-income 
countries and report the combined results.  Breaking down the data in three income categories 
reveals stark differences between them.  We find that poor countries’ environment is degraded by 
capital inflows while that of the rich countries’ improves.  These findings are consistent with the 
argument that capital flows to countries with lax environmental restrictions.   
To give an overall view of the estimated regression equation, Table 1 displays the full 
regression results for aggregate and sectoral FDI for all countries.  The full sample results are 
broadly consistent with the expected signs of the coefficients.  They indicate a strong persistence 
effect (1st row), underlying the cumulative nature of environmental degradation.   
In our analysis, we concentrate on the estimates of the pollution effect of FDI flows 𝛽𝛽4 
(row 6).  Results in aggregate, manufacturing and non-financial sectors suggest that flows into these 
industries degrade the environment in the host country.  A negative value suggests that the data 
supports the Halo Effect hypothesis.  In Table 1 we do not find evidence corroborating this 
hypothesis. The breakdown with time-varying income distribution will help further disentangle 
these results. 
There is weak evidence supporting the EKC hypothesis when inflows of investment are in 
the primary sector, services and at the aggregate level (rows 2, 3).  The two other control variables, 
corruption and population density are either insignificant or come with the wrong sign in the full 
regression results.  As we will see below, signs and significance vary at the sectoral level.   
In Table 2 we summarize the estimate of 𝛽𝛽4 across sectors and income distribution.  In 
Table 3 we present the EKC estimates according to income distribution.   
 
(i) FDI impact on pollution 
The effect of total FDI on CO2 pollution 
The first row in Table 2 reproduces the same results as row 6 in Table 1. Column 2 presents the 
breakdown of the impact of total FDI on the environment according to income categories.  The 
impact of total capital flows in the full sample on environmental degradation (1st cell) is replicated 
only in one income level.  Evidence shows a significant positive impact in low-income countries, 
suggesting that FDI inflows deteriorate the environment in the poorer countries, while they do not 
have the same harmful impact in wealthy countries.   Results at the aggregate level thus support the 
view that capital flows to poorer countries and pollute the environment.  How robust is this result 
across industries?  Next, we turn to the sectoral level analysis. 
 
The effect of primary sector FDI on CO2 pollution 
FDI inflows to both agriculture and mining do not have a significant effect on air pollution in the 
full sample.  (Table 2, first row, columns 2 and 3).  However, the impact of capital flows in these 
industries is clearly beneficial to the environment in the high-income countries corroborating the 
halo hypothesis (row 4, columns 2 and 3).  Capital flows to low- and middle-income countries do 
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not have any significant effect.  Thus, evidence supports the view that FDI inflows in agriculture 
and mining, traditionally dirty industries, bring in clean technology in the wealthy countries.  
 
The effect of manufacturing FDI on CO2 pollution     
Most of the negative impact of capital inflows on air pollution in host countries is generated by 
manufacturing FDI (column 4).  Inflows of foreign investment into this sector raises the pollution 
level significantly in the full sample (1st row).  This result is traced back to both low and high-
income countries where manufacturing FDI significantly pollutes the environment.  Manufacturing 
FDI is the only type of investment flow that does not benefit the rich countries.   
 
The effect of tertiary sector FDI on CO2 pollution 
In the full sample, the effect of FDI in services on the environment is insignificant (column 5, 1st 
row).  Yet this result conceals significant results at the more disaggregated levels.  A halo effect in 
the middle-income countries is strongly counteracted by a pollution-haven effect in the poorer 
countries (row 2) and are mitigated at the aggregate level.  The harmful effect in poorer countries 
can be traced back to non-financial services (last column, row 2) and also shows up in full sample 
(last column, first row).  There is weak evidence that the halo effect in services in the middle- 
income countries is coming from the finance industry (column 6).  In rich countries, by contrast, 
both financial and nonfinancial service FDI significantly benefit the environment by bringing in 
clean technology (columns 6 and7, last row).   
 
Summary and discussion of results on the impact of sectoral FDI on CO2 pollution and income 
distribution 
Our findings can be interpreted in two ways: at the sectoral level and at the income distribution 
level depending on whether the reader examines the results vertically or horizontally.  Examining 
the columns, at the industry level our results suggest that, foreign investment inflows into 
manufacturing is most likely to increase pollution and refute the Halo Effect hypothesis.  The 
picture with the services is less straightforward and requires examination of the data by income 
levels, which we do by considering the rows.   
Poor countries’ environment is harmed by FDI flows that use dirty technologies in 
manufacturing and services and more specifically, the nonfinancial services (2nd row). In the  
middle-income countries, FDI inflows increase pollution in agriculture and mining but bring in 
environmentally friendly technology in the service industry, most likely in finance (3rd row).  By 
contrast, rich countries benefit from all types of FDI inflows, except manufacturing, with a 
significant effect in the financial services, nonfinancial services, and in agriculture and mining, and 
enjoy the halo effect (last row).  FDI inflows do not have a significant effect on middle-income 
countries’ environment, except a halo effect in services. 
 
(ii) The EKC hypothesis and alternative measures of pollution and robustness tests 
The hypothesis that pollution worsens during the initial growth process followed by an 
improvement as income rises is not strongly supported by the data (Table 3) but the results depend 
on the type of capital flows the countries receive and their level of development.  In the full sample 
the EKC is present in countries receiving services FDI, which was also shown in Table 1.  Poor 
countries exhibit EKC effect when FDI flows to financial and nonfinancial services sector.  EKC 
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is strongly supported in high-income countries in manufacturing and weakly when we consider the 
impact of total FDI.  EKC is mostly inexistent in middle-income countries.   In other words, EKC 
is a phenomenon that appears mainly in poor and middle-income countries and mostly inexistent 
in high-income countries, except when they host FDI in manufacturing, a traditionally dirty 
industry.  
Does FDI inflows change air pollution caused by particles other than CO2, such as SO2 
(sulfur dioxide), NO2 (nitrogen dioxide) and CO (carbon monoxide)?  Although most of the 
discussion about man-made climate change centers around the impact of CO2, the other particles 
are greenhouse gases directly generated by industrial pollutants. Since data are available only for 
the OECD countries, we were able to conduct the analysis only at the sectoral level and not income 
levels.  We found that the halo effect is visible in services FDI also with SO2 and NO2 pollutants, 
especially in nonfinancial flows, whereas financial FDI contributes to a decline in NO2.  In contrast, 
data reflects a bleak picture for the CO pollution.  Evidence suggests that among OECD countries, 
FDI flows into mining and services raises the levels of CO significantly in host countries, raising a 
broader concern on FDI-induced air pollution. 
 We tried alternative measures of institutional variables.  One such measure from the same 
data source is law and order.  Results were largely consistent but with fewer significant coefficients.  
Since this is a variable more broadly defined and less precise than the corruption measure we used, 
we thus favored the latter in line with the literature.    
 We also examined if the Kyoto Protocol signed in 1997 by 191 countries and entered into 
force in 2005 had any impact on the estimates and parameter stability. If the protocol had a 
significant impact, possible changes we expected were an increase in the production costs of 
polluting industries, therefore a decline in the positive coefficients, and/or a decrease in the costs 
of clean industries and a rise in the negative coefficients.  To our surprise, our results remained 
unchanged.  This may mean either that the protocol has been ineffective, or it did not have time to 
work through the estimated coefficients.   
  Finally, we briefly review the remaining parameter estimates in the income categories.  We 
find that the persistence of pollution is highly robust to income distribution.   Control of corruption 
reduces pollution in poor countries if FDI flows in to services.  In wealthy countries control of 
corruption reduces pollution in the full sample and also if FDI flows in to manufacturing.  The sign 
of the estimate does not comes in with the expected sign at the aggregate level.  Control of 
corruption in general has no effect on environmental degradation in middle-income countries.  
Population density increases pollution in the full sample and in poor countries when capital flows 
in to services, but it has the opposite effect if it flows in services in middle-income and rich 
economies and mining in high-income countries.   
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Conclusion 
The literature on the effect of globalization on the environment is ambiguous, partly due to 
the range of different approaches followed and partly due to the drawbacks of methodologies.  We 
address these issues by adopting a unified framework and a dynamic model that allows the analysis 
of various effects over time, and a long span of data covering multi-country and industries.  Our 
study tests the halo effect hypothesis, which argues that foreign direct investment is beneficial to 
the host country because by bringing in clean technology and know-how, it improves the 
environmental standards.  We identify the channels through which the halo effect manifests by 
controlling for the type of FDI inflows, the EKC effect and the time-varying income level of the 
economies.   
We find that results vary critically according to the type of capital flow and income 
category.  On aggregate, foreign investment that flows into manufacturing and nonfinancial 
services tend to degrade the environment (negative halo effect).  When data is disaggregated at the 
income category level, our study shows that foreign investment benefits the environment in wealthy 
countries across industries, but degrades it in poor countries. Thus evidence supports a halo effect 
in rich countries and is consistent with the race-to-the bottom argument in low-income countries.  
We also find that the traditional EKC results hold at an early level of development if capital flows 
in to services sector.  As countries become wealthier, EKC is supported if countries allow capital 
inflows in traditionally dirty industries, such as manufacturing. 
Our results thus suggest that studies relying simply on aggregate data or at the opposite 
end, on firm level data, to analyze the relation between the environment and globalization miss the 
subtle characteristics of the data due to complex interaction of sectoral flows and the environment. 
These studies can lead to wrong or inconclusive inference and thus to misleading policy 
prescriptions, with a long lasting impact. 
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Notes 
 
1. One notable exception is Frankel and Rose (2005), which examines the effect of trade on environment.  
Endogeneity of trade and income is controlled for by instrumental variable approach within a cross-country 
estimation in 1990.  Although our approach is parallel to Frankel and Rose, it differs in several ways.  First, 
we do not take a single year of data but examine the evolution of the phenomenon through time, over the 
course of 38 years.  Second, our analysis is dynamic and not static.  Third, our analysis is sectoral and thus 
is able to capture the intersectoral spillovers. 
 
2. Firm level studies find mixed evidence of productivity spillovers, ranging from limited positive to no or 
negative spillovers.  At the aggregate level, the evidence has been overwhelmingly in support of positive 
impact by FDI inflows. The sectoral level analysis reconciles these inconsistent results.  Manufacturing 
FDI has positive spillovers that spur growth through its own sector, while financial services have a positive 
effect that spreads though services, whereas nonfinancial services drain resources from manufacturing with 
a negative effect on growth (see Doytch and Uctum, 2011 for a survey of the relevant literature and new 
results). 
 
3. The original pollution haven hypothesis (Copeland and Taylor, 1994) states that as trade is liberalized, 
industries that pollute shift from rich countries with tight regulation to poor countries with weak regulation 
and conversely, clean industries migrate towards rich countries. Although related to the halo effect, our 
emphasis will not be on the impact of regulation on environment and investment decisions.  For a survey of 
the earlier literature see Jaffee et al. (1995) and more recent literature Dong et al. (2012) and Chung (2014). 
 
4. The only study that examines the relationship of FDI by sectors with CO2 emissions is Blanco et al. 
(2013). The study is specific to Latin America and the Caribbean and examines FDI in various 
manufacturing industries. The study uses a simple Granger causality framework and finds a positive effect 
of "dirty" sectors FDI on pollution, but does not look into intersectoral spillovers.  
 
5. These sets of conditions are: (i) No second order autocorrelation in the error term: 
0)]([ 1,, =− −− tiitstipolE εε  for s≥2 and t=3,….T ; 0)]([ 1,, =− −− tiitstiyE εε  for s≥2 and t=3,….T; 
0)]([ 1,, =− −− tiitj stifE εε  for s≥2 and t=3,….T, where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , jitf are the level of income and FDI, respectively 
and where for  instruments we use their past levels and differences. To instrument FDI and the lagged 
output we used Stata’s GMM-style option, and to instrument the remaining variables, corruption and 
elements of the 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  matrix, we used the iv-style option. (ii) No correlation of the unobserved country-
specific effect with their difference 0)])([( 2,1, =+− −− itititi polpolE εµ ; 0)])([( 2,1, =+− −− itititi yyE εµ ;
0)])([( 2,1, =+− −− itijtijti ffE εµ ; 0)])([( 2,1, =+− −− itijtijti ffE εµ ; (iii) The last condition allows using lagged first 
differences as instruments for levels. Estimation is conducted on Stata with the xtabond 2 command. 
 
6. We present here a set of results based on the minimum number of lags and a collapsed matrix for GDP 
per capita, an approach suggested by Roodman (2009).  
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Appendix 1 
The optimal output of the multinational in the host country’s market is:  𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓 = 𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓[Γ𝑓𝑓 ,𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 , ?̅?𝑍𝑓𝑓 ,𝑋𝑋�𝑓𝑓]  (1a)       
where Γ𝑓𝑓is a vector of cost of production of the multinational in the host country. Since 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 will be a 
covariate in our reduced form pollution equation, we do not replace it in the output equation.  The pollution 
equation is obtained by substituting equations (2), (3), and (1a) into (1):                                                            
𝑍𝑍 = 𝐷𝐷 + 𝜓𝜓�𝐻𝐻[Γ,𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷����,𝑋𝑋�)] + 𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓[Γ𝑓𝑓 ,𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 , ?̅?𝑍𝑓𝑓 ,𝑋𝑋�𝑓𝑓]� = 𝑍𝑍(𝐷𝐷, Γ,Γ𝑓𝑓 ,𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 , ?̅?𝑍𝐷𝐷, ?̅?𝑍𝑓𝑓 ,𝑋𝑋�,𝑋𝑋�𝑓𝑓) 
Substituting for the optimal demand for FDI is equivalent to instrumenting 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 using factor prices.  Instead, 
the GMM methodology that we adopt computes internal instruments.  The instrumental matrix consists of 
lagged levels and lagged differences of FDI, where current levels of FDI are instrumented by lagged 
differences and current differences of FDI are instrumented by lagged levels.  
 
Log-linearizing both sides of the equation around the steady-state we get: 
𝑑𝑑𝑍𝑍
𝑍𝑍
= 𝐷𝐷
𝑍𝑍
𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷
𝐷𝐷
+ 𝜓𝜓𝜓𝜓 �𝜖𝜖Γ 𝑑𝑑ΓΓ  + 𝜖𝜖𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷 𝑑𝑑𝑍𝑍�𝐷𝐷𝑍𝑍�𝐷𝐷 + 𝜖𝜖𝑋𝑋 𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋�𝑋𝑋�  � + 𝜓𝜓(1 − 𝜓𝜓) �𝜙𝜙Γf 𝑑𝑑ΓfΓf  + 𝜙𝜙𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓 𝑑𝑑𝑍𝑍�𝑓𝑓𝑍𝑍�𝑓𝑓 + 𝜙𝜙𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓 𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋�𝑓𝑓𝑋𝑋�𝑓𝑓 + 𝜙𝜙𝐾𝐾𝑓𝑓 𝑑𝑑𝐾𝐾𝑓𝑓𝐾𝐾𝑓𝑓 �    
 
where 𝜓𝜓, 1 − 𝜓𝜓 are the share of domestic firm’s and the multinational firm’s respective outputs in total 
output Q;  𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗,𝜙𝜙𝑗𝑗 for 𝑗𝑗 = �Γ,𝑍𝑍,𝑍𝑍𝐷𝐷,𝑋𝑋 𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑋𝑋𝑓𝑓� are, respectively, the elasticities of optimal output of domestic 
and foreign firms with respect to j.   
Integrating both sides and rearranging, we get the equation (4) in the text: 
𝑧𝑧 =  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝛾𝛾 + 𝛼𝛼2𝛾𝛾𝑓𝑓 + 𝛼𝛼3?̅?𝑥 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑥𝑥𝑓𝑓� + 𝛼𝛼5𝑧𝑧𝐷𝐷��� + 𝛼𝛼6𝑧𝑧𝑓𝑓� + 𝛼𝛼7𝑓𝑓   (2a)   
where lower case variables are the natural logs of higher-case variables and the elasticities are defined as: 
𝛼𝛼0 = 𝐷𝐷0𝑍𝑍  ;  𝛼𝛼1 = 𝜓𝜓𝜓𝜓 𝜖𝜖Γ; 𝛼𝛼2 = 𝜓𝜓(1 − 𝜓𝜓) 𝜙𝜙Γ𝑓𝑓; 𝛼𝛼3 = 𝜓𝜓𝜓𝜓 𝜖𝜖𝑋𝑋; 
𝛼𝛼4 = 𝜓𝜓(1 − 𝜓𝜓) 𝜙𝜙Xf; 𝛼𝛼5 = 𝜓𝜓𝜓𝜓 𝜖𝜖𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷; 𝛼𝛼6 = 𝜓𝜓(1 − 𝜓𝜓) 𝜙𝜙𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓; 𝛼𝛼7 = (1 − 𝜓𝜓)𝜙𝜙𝐾𝐾𝑓𝑓   
 
Assuming symmetric effect for costs, output and target emissions (𝛼𝛼1 = 𝛼𝛼2,𝛼𝛼3 = 𝛼𝛼4,𝛼𝛼5 = 𝛼𝛼6) we can 
rewrite equation (2a) as 
𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖  =  𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎1𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎2𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎3𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖  (3a) 
 
where 
𝑎𝑎0 = 𝛼𝛼0𝛼𝛼5  𝑎𝑎1 = 1𝛼𝛼5 𝑎𝑎3 = 𝛼𝛼7𝛼𝛼5  
 
and 𝑦𝑦1𝑖𝑖 = [𝛾𝛾, 𝛾𝛾𝑓𝑓] 
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Appendix 2:  Country list by time-varying levels of development 
 
Low &Lower Middle Income Countries 
Albania: 1983-2007; Algeria: 1983-2007; Angola: 1983-2011; Azerbaijan: 1983-2008;  Bangladesh: 1983-
2011; Belarus: 1983-2006; Bolivia: 1983-2011; Burkina Faso: 1983-2011; Cameroon: 1983-2011; China: 
1983-2009; Colombia: 1983-2006; Congo, Rep.: 1983-2011; Cote d'Ivoire: 1983-2011; Dominican Republic: 
1983-2007; Ecuador: 1983-2009; Egypt, Arab Rep.: 1983-2011; Ethiopia: 1983-2011; Gambia, The: 1983-
2011;  Ghana: 1983-2011; Guatemala: 1983-2011; Guinea: 1983-2011; Guinea-Bissau: 1983-2011; Guyana: 
1983-2011; Haiti: 1983-2011; Honduras: 1983-2011; India: 1983-2011; Indonesia: 1983-2011; Iran: 1983-
2007; Iraq: 1983-2009; Jamaica: 1983-2004; Jordan: 1983-2010; Kenya: 1983-2011; Liberia: 1983-2011; 
Morocco: 1983-2011; Moldova: 1983-2011; Madagascar: 1983-2011; Mali: 1983-2011; Mongolia: 1983-
2011; Mozambique: 1983-2011; Malawi: 1983-2011; Namibia: 1983-2006; Nicaragua: 1983-2011; Niger: 
1983-2011; Nigeria: 1983-2011; Pakistan: 1983-2011; Peru: 1983-2009; Philippines: 1983-2011; Papua New 
Guinea: 1983-2011; Paraguay: 1983-2011; Sudan: 1983-2011; Suriname: 1983-2011; El Salvador: 1983-
2011; Senegal: 1983-2011; Sierra Leone: 1983-2011; Somalia: 1983-2011; South Africa: 1983-2004; Sri 
Lanka: 1983-2011; Syria: 1983-2011; Togo: 1983-2011; Thailand: 1983-2009; Tunisia: 1983-2008; 
Tanzania: 1983-2011;  Uganda: 1983-2011; Ukraine: 1983-2011; Vietnam: 1983-2011; Zambia: 1983-2011; 
Zimbabwe: 1983-2011; Congo, DR.: 1983-2011. 
 
Upper Middle Income Countries 
Albania: 2008-2011; Algeria: 2008-2011; Argentina: 1983-2011; Armenia: 1983-2011;  Azerbaijan: 2009-
2011; Belarus: 1907-2011; Botswana: 1983-2011; Brazil: 1983-2011; Bulgaria: 1983-2011; Chile: 1983-
2011; China: 2010-2011; Colombia: 2007-2014; Costa Rica: 1983-2011; Dominican Republic: 2008-2011; 
Ecuador 2010-2011; Gabon: 1983-2011; Croatia: 1983-2007; Iran: 2008-2011; Iraq: 2010-2011; Jamaica: 
2005-2011; Jordan: 2011; Kazakhstan: 1983-2011;  Lebanon: 1983-2011; Libya: 1983-2011; Latvia: 1983-
2006;  Lithuania: 1983-2007; Mexico: 1983-2011; Montenegro: 1983-2011; Malaysia: 1983-2011; Namibia: 
2007-2011; Oman: 1983-2006; Panama: 1983-2011; Peru: 2010-2011; Poland: 1983-2010; Romania: 1983-
2011; Russian Federation: 1983-2011; Serbia: 1983-2011; Slovakia: 1983-2005; South Africa: 2005-2011; 
Thailand: 2010-2011; Tunisia: 2009-2011; Turkey: 1983-2011; Uruguay: 1983-2011; Venezuela: 1983-
2011. 
  
High Income Countries: 
Australia: 1983-2011; Austria: 1983-2011; Bahamas: 1983-2011; Bahrain: 1983-2011; Belgium: 1983-2011; 
Brunei Darussalam: 1983-2011; Canada: 1983-2011; Cyprus: 1983-2011; Czech Republic: 1983-2011; 
Denmark: 1983-2011; Estonia: 1983-2011; Finland: 1983-2011; France: 1983-2011; Germany: 1983-2011; 
Greece: 1983-2011; Hong Kong, China: 1983-2011; Hungary: 1983-2011; Iceland: 1983-2011; Croatia: 
2008-2011; Ireland: 1983-2011; Israel: 1983-2011; Italy: 1983-2011; Japan: 1983-2011; Korea, Rep.: 1983-
2011; Kuwait: 1983-2011; Lithuania: 2008-2011; Latvia: 2007-2011; Luxembourg: 1983-2011; Malta: 1983-
2011; Netherlands 1983-2011; New Caledonia: 1983-2011; New Zealand: 1983-2011; Norway: 1983-2011; 
Oman: 2007-2011; Poland: 2011; Portugal: 1983-2011; Qatar: 1983-2011; Saudi Arabia: 1983-2011; 
Singapore: 1983-2011; Slovakia: 2006-2011; Slovenia: 1983-2011; Spain: 1983-2011; Sweden: 1983-2011; 
Switzerland: 1983-2011; Trinidad and Tobago: 1983-2011; UAE: 1983-2011; UK: 1983-2011; US: 1983-
2011. 
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Appendix Table 1A: Summary Statistics of Sectoral FDI by Country Level of Development 
All Countries Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Total FDI share of GDP 
Agricultural FDI share of GDP 
6348 
1341 
0.038 
0.001 
0.194 
0.011 
Mining FDI share of GDP 1552 0.009 0.031 
Manufacturing FDI share of GDP 1909 0.007 0.026 
Total Services FDI share of GDP 1711 0.037 0.270 
Financial Services FDI share of GDP 1553 0.024 0.272 
Nonfinancial Services FDI share of GDP  1307 0.017 0.036 
Low-Income Countries Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Total FDI share of GDP 
Agricultural FDI share of GDP 
3487 
481 
0.03 
0.003 
0.121 
0.017 
Mining FDI share of GDP 581 0.014 0.042 
Manufacturing FDI share of GDP 606 0.007 0.009 
Total Services FDI share of GDP 618 0.013 0.017 
Financial Services FDI share of GDP 471 0.003 0.007 
Nonfinancial Services FDI share of GDP 417 0.011 0.014 
Middle-Income Countries Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
    
Total FDI share of GDP 
Agricultural FDI share of GDP 
1088 
335 
0.039 
0.001 
0.065 
0.003 
Mining FDI share of GDP 376 0.007 0.016 
Manufacturing FDI share of GDP 464 0.009 0.01 
Total Services FDI share of GDP 439 0.024 0.035 
Financial Services FDI share of GDP 421 0.008 0.013 
Nonfinancial Services FDI share of GDP 378 0.017 0.027 
High-Income Countries Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
    
Total FDI share of GDP 
Agricultural FDI share of GDP 
1773 
525 
0.054 
0.001 
0.321 
0.007 
Mining FDI share of GDP 595 0.005 0.025 
Manufacturing FDI share of GDP 839 0.006 0.038 
Total Services FDI share of GDP 654 0.068 0.434 
Financial Services FDI share of GDP 
Nonfinancial Services FDI share of GDP 
661 
512 
0.050 
0.022 
0.416 
0.051 
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Table 2A: Summary Statistics as of the beginning and end of the period (years 1984 
and 2011). 
 
Variable 
Obs, 
1984 
Mean, 
1984 
Std. 
Dev., 
1984 
Obs, 
2011 
Mean, 
2011 
Std. 
Dev., 
2011 
       
GDP per capita, 2005 $ 148 8655.45 13855.07 182 10684.09 15570.78 
Anticorruption Index 112 3.242 1.557 139 2.684 1.131 
Population Density 204 293.124 1473.61 213 400.832 1898.149 
Total FDI share of GDP 129 0.007 0.016 174 0.093 0.545 
Agricultural FDI share of GDP 13 0.012 0.043 48 0.0008 0.002 
Mining FDI share of GDP 10 0.004 0.005 65 0.006 0.012 
Manufacturing FDI share of GDP 24 0.004 0.009 72 0.007 0.020 
Total Services FDI share of GDP 22 0.001 0.001 71 0.133 0.847 
Financial Services FDI share of GDP 10 0.0002 0.0007 58 0.133 0.916 
Nonfinancial Services FDI share of GDP  7 0.001 0.001 55 0.026 0.058 
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Table 1*:  Full regression results “All countries” 
 
Log CO2  All countries 
Total 
FDI/GDP  
Agricult
ure  
FDI/GDP  
Mining  
FDI/GDP  
Manuactur.  
FDI/GDP  
Services  
FDI/GDP  
Finance  
FDI/GDP  
Nonfinancial  
FDI/GDP  
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥 (𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝟐𝟐𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏) 
 
 
1.006*** 
(80.50) 
 
0.999*** 
(117.32) 
 
1.001*** 
(114.37) 
 
1.008*** 
(113.60) 
 
1.015*** 
(101.99) 
 
0.996*** 
(83.41) 
 
1.004*** 
(105.52) 
 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 (𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑 𝒄𝒄𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑹𝑹) 0.182 (1.07) 0.068 (0.51) 0.082 (0.82) -0.122 (-0.95) 0.184 (1.42) 0.106 (0.58) -0.023 (-0.13) 
[𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 (𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑 𝒄𝒄𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑹𝑹)]𝟐𝟐 -0.011 (-1.08) -0.007 (-0.86) -0.007 (-1.27) 0.004 (0.66) -0.013* (-1.69) -0.008 (-0.85) 0.000 (0.03) 
𝑪𝑪𝒍𝒍𝑪𝑪𝒕𝒕𝒑𝒑𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒐 𝒄𝒄𝒍𝒍𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒑𝒑𝒕𝒕𝒄𝒄𝒍𝒍𝑪𝑪 -0.008 (-0.64) 0.038** (1.98) 0.028* (1.95) 0.015 (1.10) 0.019 (1.35) 0.029** (2.08) -0.001 (-0.12) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍(𝑮𝑮𝑹𝑹𝑪𝑪𝑫𝑫𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑫𝑫) -0.003 (-0.78) 0.000 (0.01) 0.000 (0.04) -0.003 (-1.06) -0.000 (-0.01) -0.001 (-0.13) -0.004 (-1.00) 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍�
𝑭𝑭𝑮𝑮𝑭𝑭
𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮
�
𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏
 0.022* (1.82) 
-0.003 
(-0.51) 
0.003 
(0.49) 
0.015* 
(1.62) 
0.004 
(0.67) 
0.002 
(0.23) 
0.024** 
(2.19) 
Number of Observations 3037 847 1117 1432 1291 1179 991 
Number of Countries 132 82 87 94 93 83 82 
AR(2) 0.265 0.132 0.045 0.144 0.095 0.452 0.540 
Sargan Test 0.002 0.000 0.993 0.558 0.369 0.014 0.583 
 
* Figures in parentheses are t-statistics; * and ** denote significance at the 10 % and 5 % respectively.  
Results are robust to heteroscedasticity.  
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New Table 2:  Effect of FDI on CO2 emissions with time-varying income levels*  
 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝟐𝟐  Total FDI/GDP   Agriculture   FDI/GDP  Mining  FDI/GDP  Manufact.  FDI/GDP  Services  FDI/GDP  Finance  FDI/GDP  Nonfinancial  FDI/GDP  
All countries 
 
0.022* 
(1.82) 
-0.003 
(-0.51) 
0.003 
(0.49) 
0.015* 
(1.61) 
0.004 
(0.67) 
0.002 
(0.23) 
0.024** 
(2.19) 
 
Observations 
Countries 
AR(2) 
Sargan Test 
 
3037 
132 
0.265 
0.002 
 
847 
82 
0.132 
0.000 
 
1117 
87 
0.045 
0.993 
 
1432 
94 
0.144 
0.558 
 
1291 
93 
0.095 
0.369 
 
1179 
83 
0.452 
0.014 
 
991 
82 
0.540 
0.583 
 
Low-income 
countries 
0.032** 
(2.03) 
-0.003 
(-0.63) 
-0.003 
(-0.70) 
0.016** 
(1.95) 
0.034*** 
(3.77) 
-0.003 
(-0.48) 
0.026*** 
(3.81) 
 
Observations 
Countries 
AR(2) 
Sargan Test 
 
1488 
65 
0.875 
0.001 
 
316 
34 
0.252 
0.000 
 
411 
33 
0.376 
0.941 
 
434 
36 
0.580 
0.049 
 
445 
36 
0.414 
0.410 
 
314 
29 
0.696 
0.020 
 
287 
28 
0.561  
0.143 
 
Middle-Income 
countries 
0.002 
(0.45) 
0.004 
(0.64) 
0.005 
(0.90) 
0.001 
(0.19) 
-0.009* 
(-1.72) 
-0.013 
(-1.04) 
-0.004 
(-0.32) 
 
Observations 
Countries 
AR(2) 
Sargan Test 
 
579 
44 
0.339 
0.051 
 
222 
25 
0.070 
0.000 
 
277 
29 
0.068 
0.928 
 
333 
30 
0.465 
0.000 
 
308 
30 
0.380 
0.000 
 
301 
28 
0.661 
0.000 
 
252 
27 
0.153 
0.010 
 
High-income 
countries 
-0.006 
(-0.56) 
-0.007* 
(-1.75) 
-0.017** 
(-2.20) 
0.022** 
(2.40) 
0.001 
(0.19) 
-0.011** 
(-2.22) 
-0.015* 
(-1.82) 
 
Observations 
Countries 
AR(2) 
Sargan Test 
 
970 
47 
0.135 
0.254 
 
309 
35 
0.218 
0.040 
 
429 
39 
0.081 
0.979 
 
665 
42 
0.164 
0.880 
 
538 
41 
0.179 
0.656 
 
564 
39 
0.292 
0.008 
 
452 
39 
0.238 
0.460 
 
 
* The first entry in each cell is the estimate of the effect on pollution of FDI flows, estimated by the 
System GMM method.  Figures in parentheses are t-statistics; * and ** denote significance at the 10 % 
and 5 % respectively.  Results are robust to heteroscedasticity. 
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Table 3 :  Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) with CO2 emissions* 
With Time-varying income levels 
 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝟐𝟐 Total FDI/GDP Agriculture  FDI/GDP Mining FDI/GDP Manufact. FDI/GDP Services FDI/GDP Finance FDI/GDP Nonfinancial FDI/GDP 
All countries 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 (𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑 𝒄𝒄𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑹𝑹) 0.182 (1.07) 0.068 (0.51) 0.082 (0.82) -0.122 (-0.95) 0.184 (1.42) 0.106 (0.58) -0.023 (-0.13) 
[𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 (𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑 𝒄𝒄𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑹𝑹)]𝟐𝟐 -0.011 (-1.08) -0.007 (-0.86) -0.007 (-1.27) 0.004 (0.66) -0.013* (-1.69) -0.008 (-0.85) 0.000 (0.03) 
Low-income countries 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 (𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑 𝒄𝒄𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑹𝑹)  0.335 (0.69) 0.518 (1.24) -0.436** (-2.45) -0.439* (-1.89) 0.215 (0.43) 0.409* (1.62) 0.681* (1.66) [𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 (𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑 𝒄𝒄𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑹𝑹)]𝟐𝟐 -0.027 (-0.77) -0.039 (-1.38) 0.032** (2.39) 0.028* (1.72) -0.014 (-0.40) -0.030* (-1.62) -0.049* (-1.69) 
Middle-income countries 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 (𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑 𝒄𝒄𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑹𝑹)  -0.750 (-0.59) 0.026 (0.02) 1.279 (1.33) 0.977 (0.72) -1.766 (-0.99) -1.602 (-0.71) -1.682 (-0.90) [𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 (𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑 𝒄𝒄𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑹𝑹)]𝟐𝟐 0.042 (0.57) -0.004 (-0.06) -0.076 (-1.34) -0.058 (-0.75) 0.101 (0.98) 0.092 (0.70) 0.096 (0.89) 
High-income countries 
𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 (𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑 𝒄𝒄𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑹𝑹) 2.226 (1.57) 0.325 (0.53) 0.197 (0.25) 0.952* (1.94) 0.829 (1.05) -0.106 (-0.24) -0.081 (-0.27) 
[𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍𝒍 (𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒍𝒍 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 𝒑𝒑𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑 𝒄𝒄𝑹𝑹𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒕𝒕𝑹𝑹)]𝟐𝟐 -0.110 (-1.58) -0.018 (-0.58) -0.012 (-0.31) -0.047* (-1.90) -0.044 (-1.08) 0.003 (0.15) 0.002 (0.18) 
 
* Figures in parentheses are t-statistics; * and ** denote significance at the 10 % and 5 % respectively.  
Results are robust to heteroscedasticity 
 
 
 
